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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This petition for a writ of certiorari presents for review 
the following questions: 
1. Did the court of appeals overlook and misapprehended 
the facts in the record and fail to apply the appropriate 
standard of review requiring it to view the facts and inferences 
to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to First 
Colony, the losing party below? 
2. Did the court of appeals err in determining from the 
record in this case that Stevensons did not receive adequate 
notice of the rejection of LaMar Stevenson's application for life 
insurance? 
REFERENCE TO REPORTS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the court of appeals is reported in the 
Utah Advance Reports as Stevenson v. First Colony Life Insurance 
Company, 181 U.A.R. 65 (Utah App. 1992). The opinion was filed 
March 3, 1992. The court of appeals Case No. is 910561-CA. The 
opinion was authored by Norman H. Jackson, Appellate Court Judge, 
and concurred in by the two other judges on the panel, Judith M. 
Billings and Leonard H. Russon. 
On March 17, 1992, appellee First Colony filed a petition 
for rehearing. On April 17, 1992, pursuant to request from the 
Court of Appeals, appellant filed a response to the petition for 
rehearing. 
On May 22, 1992, the court of appeals entered its order 
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denying the petition for rehearing. Judge Leonard H. Russon 
dissented. 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The date of entry of the decision sought to be reviewed is 
March 3, 1992. As stated above, appellee filed a petition for 
rehearing which was ultimately denied by order of the court of 
appeals entered May 22, 1992. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court originally had jurisdiction over this appeal by 
virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(i) in 
that this appeal was originally taken from an order of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court for Utah County over which the Utah Court 
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. The 
defendant/appellee/cross-appellant, First Colony Life Insurance 
Company, was entitled to its appeal as a matter of right by 
virtue of the order of the trial court entered on April 30, 199 0, 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This court should exercise its judicial discretion to 
grant a writ of certiorari pursuant to Rule 4 6(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure on the ground that the court of 
appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from the 
excepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for 
an exercise of this court's power of supervision. Specifically, 
the Utah Court of Appeals overlooked and misapprehended the facts 
in the record and failed to apply the appropriate standard of 
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review. In determining whether the trial court correctly found 
that there was no genuine issue of material fact, the court of 
appeals was required to "view the facts and inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party." 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt v. Blomcruist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 
1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 
(Utah 1987); Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 
802 (Utah 1985) . As will be argued below, the Utah Court of 
Appeals failed to do so. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
LaMar Stevenson was killed in an automobile accident on 
October 16, 1986. The plaintiff and appellee, Maurine Stevenson, 
filed this action against First Colony Insurance Company and 
others, claiming, among other things, that a valid temporary 
contract of insurance existed at the time of her husband's death. 
Defendant and appellant First Colony Life Insurance 
Company filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the 
temporary contract of insurance created by the conditional 
receipt was terminated by First Colony's rejection of LaMar 
Stevenson's insurance application and notification to Mr. 
Stevenson of that rejection. The plaintiff countered with a 
motion for summary judgment arguing that the contract remained in 
force as a result of the failure of defendant to give written 
notice of the rejection and failure to return the premium prior 
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to LaMar Stevenson's death. 
Without oral argument, the trial court granted plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment and denied First Colony's motion for 
summary judgment, relying upon the authority of the California 
Supreme Court case of Smith v. Westland Life Insurance Company, 
539 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975), and holding that "because there was not 
adequate notice that plaintiff's temporary insurance had been 
cancelled, and because the premium was not returned timely, the 
contract was in full force and effect at the time of Mr. 
Stevenson's death." R. 296-297. After objections and oral 
argument over the amount of the coverage, the court untimely 
entered judgment in the amount of $300,000 plus interest. 
On April 30, 1990, the court entered an order for Rule 
54(b) certification. R. 487-488. 
Defendant/appellee and cross-appellant First Colony filed 
its notice of appeal with this court on May 16, 1990, appealing 
the order granting plaintiff summary judgment and denying the 
motion of First Colony Life Insurance Company for summary 
j udgment. 
After briefing, this court assigned the appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals and the Utah Court of Appeals ultimately entered 
its opinion on March 3, 1992, as set forth above. First Colony's 
petition for rehearing filed March 17, 1992, was denied by order 
of the Court of Appeals entered on May 22, 1992. 
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B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In May of 1986, Roger Fleiss, LaMar Stevenson's insurance 
agent employed by Talbert Agency, recommended to LaMar Stevenson 
that he obtain a life insurance policy with First Colony Life 
Insurance Company. R. 124, 144-147. On June 30, 1986, LaMar 
Stevenson filled out and signed an application for life insurance 
with First Colony and on July 7, 1986, he gave his agent a check 
payable to First Colony in the amount of $410 as an initial 
premium payment. R. 124, 149-150. The check for $410 was 
forwarded to United Underwriters, the general agent in the State 
of Utah for First Colony Life Insurance Company. United 
Underwriters negotiated the check. 
On that same date, July 7, 1986, Norman Close, another 
agent of LaMar Stevenson and employee of the Talbert Agency, 
issued, on behalf of First Colony Life Insurance Company, a 
conditional receipt stating that coverage was dependent upon the 
insurer's determination of whether or not the applicant was 
insurable. R. 124, 152. 
At the time the conditional receipt was issued on July 7, 
1986, it was standard practice in the life insurance industry 
that a conditional receipt not be issued for more than $250,000, 
a practice which was followed by First Colony Life Insurance 
Company. Affidavit of Leonard Reynolds, R. 349-350. First 
Colony Life Insurance Company intended to issue the conditional 
receipt for the amount of $250,000, a sum which is $50,000 less 
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than the $3 00,000 amount which the conditional receipt 
specifically establishes as an amount which cannot be exceeded. 
Affidavit of Loretta Stacey and attached exhibit, R. 351-353• 
Upon receipt of LaMar Stevenson's insurance application, 
United Underwriters informed the Talbert office that First Colony 
would not bind coverage under a conditional receipt for more than 
$250,000. Exhibit A to Affidavit of Loretta Stacey, R. 353. 
Talbert, in turn, informed the Stevensons and it was agreed that 
the amount of insurance effective under the conditional receipt 
was $250,000. R. 353. Norman Close testified that Exhibit A of 
the Loretta Stacey affidavit was accurate in stating that Mr. 
Stevenson agreed to temporary coverage under the conditional 
receipt being limited to $250,000. Transcript of Norman Close 
Deposition pp. 93-94, 98. 
In August of 1986, First Colony Life Insurance Company 
notified Talbert Corporation that the life insurance application 
of LaMar Stevenson had been rejected and defendants Roger Fleiss 
and Talbert Corporation notified the Stevensons that First Colony 
had rejected the life insurance application. R. 154-158, 161. 
Plaintiff Maurine Stevenson specifically acknowledged in her 
deposition testimony that she was told that First Colony had 
declined coverage on LaMar. Maurine Stevenson deposition, pp. 
46-48, 105 and 106, R. 154-158; see also Plaintifffs Answers to 
Interrogatories at p. 3, R. 161. As of August, 1986, the 
Stevensons knew that First Colony Life Insurance Company had 
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denied LaMar Stevenson's application and that insurance was not 
in force. R. 154-158. One month later, on October 1, 1986, 
LaMar Stevenson signed and submitted an application for life 
insurance with Banker's Life Insurance Company which specifically 
disclosed that he had been declined by First Colony due to the 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy status of his business. R. 168. On 
September 29, 1986, United Underwriters, the general agent for 
First Colony, advised Mr. Stevenson's agents, Roger Fleiss and 
Talbert Corporation, that First Colony was closing its file and 
would return the premium within ten days. R. 256, para. 7; see 
also R. 284, Entry for 9-29-86. At no time did First Colony or 
United Underwriters ever refuse to refund Stevenson's premium 
deposit; Maurine Stevenson testified that she knew First Colony 
had denied the application, but understood that the premium would 
be returned to the agent and used to apply with another company. 
R. 342-343. She was not disturbed by the fact that the premium 
was not returned. R. 343. 
LaMar Stevenson was killed in an automobile accident on 
October 16, 1986, before Banker's Life had finished processing 
his insurance application. R. 125, 170. Due to oversight on the 
part of employees of United Underwriters, the premium deposit of 
$410 was not returned until after Mr. Stevenson's death, on 
December 4, 1986. R. 125, 172-173. 
First Colony denied coverage for the death of LaMar 
Stevenson because it had effectively terminated the temporary 
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insurance contract in question by rejecting the application and 
providing notice of the rejection to the Stevensons over one and 
one-half months prior to LaMar Stevenson's accidental death on 
October 16, 1986. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND 
MISAPPREHENDED FACTS IN THE RECORD OF 
THIS CASE AND FAILED TO APPLY THE 
APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW, WHICH 
REQUIRED THAT IT VIEW THE FACTS AND 
INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN THEREFROM IN THE 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO FIRST COLONY. 
CORRECT APPLICATION OF THAT STANDARD OF 
REVIEW REQUIRED THE COURT OF APPEALS TO 
FIND AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT FIRST COLONY 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY EFFECTIVELY 
TERMINATED ITS TEMPORARY CONTRACT OF LIFE 
INSURANCE BY REJECTING THE APPLICATION OF 
LAMAR STEVENSON AND COMMUNICATING NOTICE 
OF THAT REJECTION TO HIM PRIOR TO HIS 
DEATH. 
On page 68 of the opinion in the Utah Advance Reports, the 
Court of Appeals summarizes its holding and the facts as follows: 
. . . To be sufficient, the notice must 
be definite and certain, and leave no 
doubt in the mind of the recipient that 
the rejection of insurance is effective 
upon receipt of the notice. . . We 
disagree with First Colony's contention 
that a phone call made by an unidentified 
agent of First Colony, to an unidentified 
person other than Stevenson, the 
applicant, which allegedly communicated 
First Colony's decision to decline 
Stevenson's application, was adequate 
notice. In addition, there is no 
evidence in the record concerning the 
contents of the communication. No 
effective date of termination of the 
temporary insurance was given and there 
was no indication when the premium 
payment would be returned. 
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In sum, we hold that notice must be 
clearly and unequivocally communicated to 
the applicant in an unambiguous manner. 
In the case before us, we cannot say that 
First Colony effectively dispatched 
notice to Stevenson that his temporary 
insurance was terminated. 
In reaching its ruling, the Court of Appeals 
misapprehended the facts, failing to view them from the record in 
the light most favorable to First Colony. 
First, although the record shows Maurine Stevenson called 
"an unidentified" person, notice involved much more. Confirming 
notice was later received from Stevensons' long-time agent, and 
communications regarding other options took place for two months 
after the initial notice on August 12, 1986 and before LaMar 
Stevenson's death on October 16, 1986. The following is what 
happened. Maurine Stevenson's husband reminded her that they had 
". . .not received that policy yet, and I said no, that's true, 
so then I initiated a call to Roger's office." Maurine Stevenson 
Deposition at 45, a copy is attached as Exhibit C to this 
petition. Roger (Fleiss) worked for Talbert corporation and was 
Stevensons' insurance agent beginning in 1982. Roger Fleiss was 
in Denver when she called, so she talked to an unidentified 
person and was told, after that person checked the file, that 
"First Colony had declined coverage on LaMar" because his company 
filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Maurine Stevenson Deposition at 45-
47, copy attached as Exhibit A. 
Roger Fleiss called her the next "day or so" and told her 
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that First Colony had declined coverage on LaMar. He further 
said that he "didn't see any problem because he could get LaMar 
right into another company . . . " Stevenson Deposition at 47, 
attached as Exhibit C. She said: 
Q. What sticks in your mind was that Roger 
confirmed yes, First Colony won't issue the policy 
and we'll just try to get you some where else? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that what it was? 
A. Yes. 
Stevenson Deposition at 48, attached as Exhibit A. Fleiss said 
other things discussed below, but on the issue of identification 
it is clear that in Mrs. Stevenson's mind Roger Fleiss gave 
notice of termination. 
Additionally on the issue of identification, the chain of 
notice can be traced back to a person named Cindy at United 
Underwriters, First Colony's agent, using Talbert Corporations 
log of events, entry dated 8-12-86. Roger Fleiss Deposition at 
104, Exhibits 19 and 23, copies attached as Exhibit D. 
Second, the court states that the notice was given to 
someone "other than [Mr.] Stevenson." It is true that the 
communication was made to Mrs. Stevenson, but it is also clear 
that Mr. Stevenson got notice. On page 96 of her deposition, 
Maurine Stevenson says "basically at that point that we found out 
First Colony wouldn't cover . . . [Fleiss said] we would just go 
with another company." Stevenson Deposition at 95-96, copy 
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attached as Exhibit E. She uses the plural, "we" indicating that 
her husband was included. But even if the court thinks there is 
a question, it should be construed in favor of the losing party 
and remanded to the lower court for a finding.1 
In addition to Maurine Stevenson's references to her 
husband, there are other evidences in the record that Mr. 
Stevenson was given notice. For example, Mr. Stevenson followed 
his agent's advice and applied for another policy. After First 
Colony had declined the application for term insurance, First 
Colony Life One, a sister company to First Colony, sent proposals 
for a universal life policy to Roger Fleiss. These were given to 
Stevenson with an application for Banker's Life term insurance. 
Letter dated August 28, 1986, to Roger Fleiss, copy attached as 
Exhibit F; log of events, 9-27-86, Exhibit D. But universal or 
whole life policies were too expensive for Stevensons. High 
premium is why Stevensons let their Chubb policy lapse the prior 
spring leaving them uninsured. Stevenson Deposition at 32-33, 
copy attached as Exhibit G. The universal policy proposals 
showed annual premiums of $4500 to $5000 annually. Maurine 
Stevenson Deposition Exhibits 11-13, copies attached as Exhibit H 
-J-It was natural for Maurine Stevenson to receive the notice. 
Not only had she made the initial phone call after being prompted 
by her husband to check on the status of the application, but she 
expected to enjoy the benefits of the policy. She was a trustee, 
with her husband, of the trust that was the beneficiary of the 
policy as shown on the applications. See Exhibits G and I. She 
also wrote the premium check and gave it to Fleiss to hold while 
First Colony considered the application. 
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to this petition. Thus, Stevensons did not apply for the First 
Colony Life One universal policy, but instead applied for the 
Banker's Life term policy with a lower premium on October 1, 
198 6, one month later. Copy of application to Banker's Life 
attached as Exhibit I. Receipt of the universal life proposal 
after declination of the term policy, was written evidence that 
First Colony declined the term policy. What other explanation is 
there when the facts are viewed as a whole? 
Not only did Mr. Stevenson apply to Banker's life, but he 
and his wife completed the Banker's Life application, stating in 
answer to question 30 that he had previously been declined. He 
then signed the application. The application was then sent to 
Talbert Corporation. Maurine Stevenson Deposition at 98, copy 
attached as Exhibit J; log of events, entries 9-27-86 and 10-1-
86, copy attached as Exhibit D. In his earlier application to 
First Colony Mr. Stevenson stated he had never been declined. 
Stevenson Deposition, Exhibit 15, part II, question 10, copy 
attached as Exhibit K. Thus, it is clear that the declination 
referred to in his Banker's Life application referred to First 
Colony.2 This is the second clear written evidence that Mr. 
2The opinion says at pages 2-3 that Norman Close added a 
comment to the application that the declination was "First Colony 
declination due to a business owned filed chapter 11. . . ", but 
never discussed with Mr. Stevenson what he added. The added 
comment was not an attempt to hide something, nor did it. The 
obvious reason he did not discuss it with Stevenson was because it 
was a clarification which Mr. Stevenson understood. First Colony 
was Mr. Stevenson's only declination as shown by both First Colony 
and Banker's Life applications. If there were prior declinations, 
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Stevenson understood he was terminated. At least, when viewed in 
a light most favorable to First Colony, it raises a question of 
fact. 
The expectation of no possible coverage is also consistent 
with the reason given for declination. Mr. Stevenson's business 
filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This problem could not reasonably 
be expected to be cured in the near future, and thus there was no 
reasonable expectation that First Colony would change its 
position and reconsider the application. There is not one 
scintilla of evidence that First Colony reconsidered, or could 
reasonably be expected to reconsider, its declination based on 
bankruptcy. On the contrary, Roger Fleiss spent the next two 
months talking about and working on getting other insurance for 
Stevensons. 
Finally, there was evidence that the content of the 
communication was adequate. The appellate court opinion says 
there was "no effective date of termination" given, and "no 
indication when the premium would be returned." The date of 
termination of the policy Mrs. Stevenson understood by her own 
admission to be the date of Roger Fleiss' phone call. On page 
105 she states that she understood she had coverage from the time 
she wrote the premium check up to the time that Roger Fleiss 
First Colony would probably not have issued a conditional receipt 
for temporary coverage while the application was considered, and 
First Colony's declination was the reason that Stevensons could 
not get temporary coverage while Banker's Life considered their application. 
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called her and said that "First Colony wouldn't cover you." She 
said: 
Q. It was your understanding, I believe 
you said, that when you wrote the check, 
Exhibit 17, you understood that you had 
coverage with First Colony? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. But you understood that that existed 
up to, I think you said earlier, a 
certain point that you had discussed, and 
I assume you meant by that statement when 
you were notified by Roger Fleiss that 
First Colony wouldn't cover you? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. From the point that Roger Fleiss 
notified you or United Underwriters, 
which ever it was first, you understood 
that you didn't have coverage with First 
Colony Life; is that correct? 
A. Probably. 
This reference to the date of termination is not isolated 
testimony, but is found in other places in her deposition. For 
example, see pages 45-48 attached as Exhibit C, and page 94 
attached as Exhibit L. With regard to the return of premium, 
Stevensons' agent was also told that the premium would be 
returned within 10 days. Exhibit D, entry dated 9-29-86. But 
more importantly, Stevensons were not worried about return of the 
premium. At page 105 she says that she did not expect to receive 
the premium back. She said: 
Q. When you wrote the premium and 
you gave it to Roger or Talbert 
Corporation, and when they started to 
look for another policy for you, it was 
you understanding, wasn't it, that you 
would not receive the premium back — 
A. Yes. 
Q. —the refund back? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You knew that First Colony had 
denied your application, but you 
understood that the premium would be 
returned to Roger or his company and that 
they would reuse it, reapply it in-house 
to a new policy; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
It is clear from plaintiff's own testimony that there was 
adequate communication on the issue of return of premium. 
Clearly Stevensons were not wondering if the policy had been 
canceled because the premium had not been returned. 
While it is true that written notice giving a date of 
termination and returning the premium would have been proper, it 
is also true that it would not have made the finality and reality 
of the termination any clearer in Stevensons' minds than the 
notice they got. Stevensons' expectation is the important 
determination, and admission is the best evidence of that — even 
better than written notice. It is conclusive. Even if not 
conclusive, it raises a question of fact when one views the facts 
and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the losing party. 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to imagine stronger evidence of 
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termination than the evidence found in this case, because it 
comes from the plaintiff. Therefore, based on the above, this 
court should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and 
determine as a matter of law that the Court of Appeals 
misapprehended the facts and failed to apply the appropriate 
standard of review, pursuant to which it would have to have 
concluded that the Stevensons received adequate notice. In the 
alternative, this court should view the facts in a light most 
favorable to Appellee and remand to the district court for 
findings of fact. J 
DATED this J±^_ day of June, 1992. 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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8*AR 31992 
Maurine Stevenson, as personal 
representative of LaMar 
Stevenson, and as trustee of 
LaMar D. Stevenson Trust, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, and 
Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
First Colony Life Insurance 
Company; Talbert Corporation; 
and Roger Fleiss, 
Defendants, Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 910561-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 3 , 1992) 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Ray M. Harding 
Attorneys: Allen K. Young and Douglas A. Baxter, Springville, 
for Appellant 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
In May of 1986, LaMar Stevenson, having been delinquent on 
several premiums due on a life insurance policy with Chubb Life 
American, was cancelled by Chubb. Stevenson then sought new life 
insurance coverage on himself through Roger Fleiss, an insurance 
salesman, and Talbert Corporation,1 Fleiss's employer at all 
1. Talbert Corporation has offices in Salt Lake City, Utah and 
Denver, Colorado. Roger Fleiss was affiliated with the Salt Lake 
City office at all times relevant to.this case, and Norman Close 
was affiliated with the Denver office. "Talbert Corporation," 
for purposes of this opinion, refers to the corporation, and no 
particular office, unless otherwise designated. 
times relevant to this case. Talbert Corporation and Fleiss 
recommended to Stevenson that he seek life insurance through 
First Colony Life Insurance Company, 
Stevenson filled out and signed an application provided by 
Talbert Corporation through Fleiss for life insurance with First 
Colony in June 1986. The application was signed by Stevenson as 
the proposed insured, by Roger Fleiss as witness, and by Norman 
Close of the Denver office of Talbert Corporation as licensed 
registered agent. Someone wrote on the original application that 
it was for $1,000,000 coverage. That figure was crossed out and 
$500,000 written in its place. All parties agree that Stevenson 
applied for $500,000 in the life insurance application. 
Stevenson tendered a check payable to First Colony in the amount 
of $410 shortly after the application was completed. The check 
was dated July 7, 1986 and represented the first semiannual 
premium payment. A conditional receipt was issued to Stevenson 
by First Colony which set forth the conditions under which 
conditional coverage would become effective prior to policy 
delivery. The conditional receipt was referred to in two 
separate paragraphs on the application, and was attached to the 
application as the last page. The receipt was dated July 7, 
1986, and bears only the signature of Norman Close. The 
conditional receipt further stated that the total amount of life 
insurance which may become effective prior to policy delivery 
could not exceed $300,000. First Colony introduced evidence 
which indicated that Stevenson was aware the conditional policy 
was for $300,000, and that he further agreed in a telephone 
conversation with a First Colony representative to lower the 
amount of coverage provided in the conditional receipt to 
$250,000. First Colony negotiated Stevenson's premium check 
shortly thereafter. 
In August 1986, Stevenson's wife, Maurine Stevenson, 
contacted the Salt Lake office of Talbert Corporation to ask why 
her husband had not received a policy from First Colony. The 
record indicates that she spoke with an unidentified person in 
that office, who informed her that First Colony was not going to 
insure Stevenson. The reason given to her was that one of 
Stevenson's companies was in bankruptcy. Neither Stevenson nor 
his wife received notice of declination from First Colony. The 
parties do not dispute that First Colony did not notify either of 
the Stevensons personally or by any form of written notice. In 
addition, nothing in the record indicates First Colony sent 
written notice to Talbert Corporation, and the record is unclear 
as to how someone at Talbert Corporation became aware that First 
Colony had declined Stevenson's application. 
Stevenson sought life insurance coverage with Bankers Life 
Company in early October 1986. After Stevenson completed the 
necessary information on the application, he gave the application 
to Norman Close, who added a comment to the application, 
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disclosing that Stevenson had been declined coverage by First 
Colony. Norman Close never discussed with the Stevensons what he 
had added to the application. Stevenson was killed in an 
accident on October 18, 1986. At the time of his death, neither 
United Underwriters nor First Colony had returned the premium of 
$410 paid by Stevenson. The premium payment was not tendered to 
Maurine Stevenson until December 1986. 
The plaintiff, Maurine Stevenson, filed this action against 
defendants First Colony, Roger Fleiss, and Talbert Corporation, 
claiming, among other things, that a valid contract of insurance 
existed at the time of her husband's death. This contention was 
based upon the fact that no written notice of rejection of the 
life insurance application was given by First Colony and the 
premium payment was not returned until months after Stevenson's 
death. The original complaint stated the life insurance in 
effect at the time of Stevenson's death was for $250,000. The 
complaint was amended to reflect an amount of $500,000. 
On October 19, 1989, First Colony filed a motion for summary 
judgment, contending that the temporary contract of insurance 
created by the conditional receipt terminated with First Colony's 
rejection of Stevenson's insurance application and oral 
notification to the Stevensons, through Fleiss or Talbert 
Corporation. Maurine Stevenson countered with a motion for 
summary judgment, arguing that a valid contract of insurance 
remained in force as a result of the failure of First Colony to 
give notice of rejection and to return the premium. 
After considering the motions for summary judgment without 
oral argument, the trial court granted Maurine Stevenson's motion 
for summary judgment and denied First Colony's motion. The trial 
court then entered judgment in the amount of $500,000 for Maurine 
Stevenson. On March 2, 1990, after oral argument on the amount 
of the judgment, the trial court vacated its earlier order and 
entered judgment for Maurine Stevenson in the amount of $300,000, 
based on only the terms of the conditional receipt, and not the 
face amount of the application. We affirm. 
ISSUES 
Both parties appeal. Maurine Stevenson appeals the trial 
court's determination that the amount of the policy which became 
effective upon issuance of the conditional receipt was $3 00,000. 
In arguing that judgment should be for $500,000, she claims there 
was a reasonable expectation of full and immediate coverage in 
the amount of $500,000; that the conditional receipt cannot be 
construed to limit the amount of that liability; that the policy 
must be considered together with the receipt; that if an 
ambiguity exists, it should be resolved in favor of the insured; 
that a handwritten provision prevails over a printed limitation; 
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and that this court should impose full liability on First Colony 
in view of First Colony's delay in notifying the Stevensons of 
rejection and in returning the premium paid by the Stevensons. 
First Colony appeals the trial court's determination that 
life insurance coverage was in effect at the time of Stevenson's 
death. Specifically, First Colony challenges the trial court's 
determination that First Colony did not effectively terminate the 
temporary insurance contract; that the Stevensons did not receive 
adequate notice that First Colony had rejected Stevenson's 
application for life insurance; and that written notice and 
return of premium payment was required to terminate the temporary 
insurance contract. In the alternative, First Colony claims that 
if its life insurance coverage was in effect at the time of 
Stevenson's death, the judgment should have been for $250,000. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This court has recently articulated its settled standard of 
review for summary judgement: "Summary judgment can be granted 
when no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,,11 Silcox v. 
Skaggs Aloha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 623 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citations omitted). "Inasmuch as a challenge to summary 
judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, because, by 
definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues, this 
Court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions." 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) (citation 
omitted). As for the trial court's determination on the amount 
of damages, the trial court interpreted the insurance contract as 
a matter of law and therefore we review its construction under a 
correctness standard. See Seashores Inc. v. Hancey. 738 P.2d 
645, 647 (Utah App. 1987). 
While we would normally address those issues raised in the 
direct appeal first and then address the cross-appeal issues, in 
this case we first address cross-appellant First Colony's 
challenge to the summary judgment. If we find that summary 
judgment was improperly granted, we need not reach the other 
issues raised by either party. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MAURINE STEVENSON 
First Colony alleges that Maurine Stevenson's own admissions 
during discovery establish that First Colony declined to insure 
her husband, that the Stevensons were aware of the declination, 
and that First Colony therefore unconditionally terminated the 
temporary contract of insurance prior to Stevenson's death. The 
trial court disagreed, finding that "because there was not 
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adequate notice that plaintiff's temporary insurance had been 
cancelled, and because the premium was not returned timely, the 
contract was in full force and effect at the time of Mr. 
Stevenson's death." Therefore, we must determine whether the 
notice to Talbert Corporation that Stevenson's application for 
life insurance had been declined by First Colony was adequate 
notice to Stevenson to terminate the temporary contract of 
insurance, and whether return of the premium by First Colony to 
Stevenson was a condition precedent to unilateral termination.2 
The trial court explicitly relied upon Smith v. Westland 
Life Ins. Co.. 539 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975), in reaching its decision 
that the policy was in effect at the time of Stevenson's death. 
In that case, the supreme court of California held that when an 
insurer has received an application for life insurance together 
with payment of the first premium, a provisional contract 
granting temporary insurance is created. That contract is not 
terminated, according to the California court, until the insurer 
has nullified the two factors that gave rise to the applicant's 
expectation that he or she was covered: "his signing of the 
application and his payment of the premium." Id. at 442. 
In Smith, the applicant signed an application for life 
insurance and tendered the first month's premium. The insurance 
agent provided the applicant with a conditional receipt, similar 
to the receipt issued in the case at bar. After the insurance 
company processed the application, the agent delivered to the 
applicant a policy which modified some of the terms originally 
agreed upon. The applicant refused to accept or sign the 
modified policy. After several unsuccessful attempts to persuade 
the applicant to accept the policy as modified, the agent told 
the applicant his premium would be refunded. The following day 
the applicant died. The issue on appeal was whether, prior to 
the applicant's death, the insurance company effectuated a 
termination of the temporary insurance. 
The court found that the applicant had not received written 
notice of termination of his temporary insurance and "[o]ral 
communications between Smith and Westland's agents were generally 
shrouded in terms of his acceptance of a policy with minor 
modifications." Id. at 444. Further, the applicant never 
received a refund of his premium before his fatal accident. The 
2. Both First Colony and Maurine Stevenson attempt to frame the 
issue in this case as one of "is written notice required?" 
However, the trial court, while stating the issue as "whether 
written notice and return of the premium is required to terminate 
a temporary life insurance contract," held that "because there 
was not adequate notice . . . and because the premium was not 
returned timely, the contract was in full force and effect at the 
time of Mr. Stevenson's death." 
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court's rationale rested upon the principle of effectuating the 
expectations of the ordinary applicant. Id. at 441. The court 
concluded that an insurer does not terminate temporary coverage 
until "(a) the insurer has actually rejected the application and 
by appropriate notice communicated such rejection to the insured 
and (b) refunded the premium payment to the insured." Id. at 
440. The trial court in the instant case quoted this language 
from Smith and held that the First Colony temporary insurance 
contract had not been terminated. 
Relying on Winger v. Gem State Mut.. 22 Utah 2d 132, 449 
P.2d 982 (1969) and Long v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 29 Utah 
2d 204f 507 P.2d 375 (1973), First Colony argues that it 
effectively terminated its obligations under the temporary life 
insurance contract by rejection of the application and notice of 
the rejection to Talbert Corporation. In Winger,, the insurance 
company which had issued conditional life insurance coverage to 
an applicant determined that the applicant was not insurable. 
The company sent written notice of rejection to its agent with 
instructions to notify the applicant that his application had 
been declined. The applicant died before the insurance company's 
agent was able to contact him. The court held no contract of 
insurance existed at the time of death because the insurance 
company "acted with reasonable dispatch in attempting to 
communicate to [the applicant] its action declining his 
application." Winger, 449 P.2d at 983. In Long, the Utah 
Supreme Court first determined that a conditional receipt 
"created temporary insurance coverage until such time as the 
insurers had considered the application and determined to issue a 
policy or reject the risk." Long, 507 P.2d at 379. The Long 
court further held that "the insurer cannot terminate the risk so 
assumed unless the insured is notified during his lifetime that 
the application was rejected." Id. 
We agree with First Colony that Utah law establishes that a 
contract of temporary insurance is effectively terminated when 
the application is rejected and the applicant is given adequate 
notice of that rejection.3 However, none of the cases cited by 
First Colony reach the issue of what is "adequate notice." In 
3. See also Prince v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co., 19 Utah 2d 
174, 428 P.2d 163, 167 (1967) (no notice of rejection to insured 
and no return of premium meant policy in effect at time of 
death). The Smith case, relied upon by the trial court, also 
articulated this general rule: "the most frequently stated rule 
appears to be that a temporary contract of insurance is 
terminated by rejection of the application and notice thereof to 
the insured," 539 P.2d at 439 (citing 9 Couch on Insurance, 
§ 39:207, at 653 (2d ed. 1962)). 
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the absence of express contractual or statutory provisions/ we 
must identify what constitutes adequate notice to terminate a 
temporary life insurance contract. 
"From the standpoint of content, all that is required of a 
notice of cancellation is that it be sufficiently specific to 
manifest an intent to cancel, and to identify the policy in 
question." 17 Couch on Insurance 2d, § 67:138 at 599 (rev. ed. 
1985); see also Ouindlen v. Prudential Ins. Co., 482 F.2d 876, 
879 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejection of application requires 
communication from company to applicant, as whole purpose of 
prepayment receipt is to assure an applicant that he is insured 
until company acts—not that he is insured if: the company acts) ; 
Northern Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 4 Ariz. App. 217, 419 P.2d 347, 349 
(1966) ("[t]hough mutual consent to cancel may be expressed or 
implied from the circumstances . . . such presupposes some 
communication from the insured to the mind of the insurer."); 
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Bank of Mantee, 241 So. 2d 822, 825 
(Miss. 1970) (cancellation must be definite, clear and 
unequivocal); Colorado Life Co. v. Teague, 117 S.W.2d 849, 856 
(Tx. Civ. App. 1938) ("[i]nsurer cannot terminate the risk so 
assumed otherwise than by notice brought home to the insured in 
his lifetime that his application was rejected."). See generally 
45 C.J.S., Insurance, § 450 p. 86 (1946) (in absence of 
contractual or statutory provision as to form of notice, all that 
is required is that notice is definite and unequivocally shows 
4. Various sections of the Utah Insurance Code, for example, are 
instructional in determining how insurance policies other than 
temporary life insurance contracts may be cancelled by the 
insurer or the insured. Termination of many insurance policies 
is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303 (Supp. 1991). That 
section provides that cancellation is effective only after the 
delivery or first class mailing of a written notice to the policy 
holder. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(2)(b) (Supp. 1991) 
(explicitly excluding applicability to life and disability 
insurance, see, e.g., § 31A-21-303(1)(a)). 
Similarly, under § 31A-22-423 (1991), the section that deals 
with examination periods for life insurance policies, the policy 
owner may return the policy within ten days after its delivery. 
"Return" is explicitly defined in that section to mean "delivery 
to the insurer or its agent, or mailing the policy to either, 
properly addressed and stamped for first class handling, with a 
written statement on the policy or an accompanying writing that 
it is being returned for termination 9f coverage. See also 
Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Actual Receipt of Cancellation 
Notice Mailed by Insurer as Prerequisite to Cancellation of 
Insurance, 40 A.L.R. 4th 867, 876-77 (1985) (overview of methods 
by which insurance policies can be effectively cancelled). 
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cancellation will take effect at the expiration of prescribed 
period). 
The above cited sources reveal that a declination or 
cancellation notice must be communicated clearly enough to the 
insured or applicant so that he or she understands that the 
insurance coverage is no longer effective. To be sufficient, the 
notice must be definite and certain, and leave no doubt in the 
mind of the recipient that the rejection of insuirance is 
effective upon receipt of the notice. The only evidence First 
Colony puts forth concerning the manner of communicating 
declination is Maurine Stevenson's deposition and her responses 
to interrogatories. This evidence reveals only that someone at 
Talbert Corporation informed Maurine Stevenson orally over the 
telephone that First Colony had declined the application. The 
phone call was initiated by Maurine Stevenson, who was concerned 
that her husband had not received the policy. Neither of the 
Stevensons ever spoke directly to anyone from First Colony. 
First Colony does not claim to know who from their office made 
the communication, or to whom at Talbert Corporation it was made. 
We disagree with First Colony's contention that a phone call made 
by an unidentified agent of First Colony, to an unidentified 
person other than Stevenson, the applicant, which allegedly 
communicated First Colony's decision to decline Stevenson's 
application, was adequate notice. In addition, there is no 
evidence in the record concerning the contents of the 
communication. No effective date of termination of the temporary 
insurance was given and there was no indication when the premium 
payment would be returned. 
In sum, we hold that notice must be clearly and 
unequivocally communicated to the applicant in an unambiguous 
manner. In the case before us, we cannot say that First Colony 
effectively dispatched notice to Stevenson that his temporary 
insurance was terminated. 
AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT 
Both parties have claimed error in the amount of damages 
awarded to Maurine Stevenson. Maurine Stevenson appeals the 
trial court's entry of judgment for $3 00,000, claiming it was too 
low; First Colony appeals, claiming the amount was too high. 
Maurine Stevenson urges us to hold as a matter of law that 
the life insurance application and conditional receipt are 
ambiguous, and that any uncertainty or ambiguity in the terms 
should be construed in favor of the insured. While this is true, 
it is also true that in determining the intent of this contract, 
we examine the language of the contract itself first, "and unless 
there is some ambiguity or uncertainty, there is no justification 
for attempting to vary it by extrinsic or parol evidence." 
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Williams v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 
1979) . The trial court did not find the insurance contract to be 
ambiguous and neither do we.5 See id. (supreme court finds 
similar contract to be unambiguous). 
We agree with the trial court, that as a matter of law the 
amount of temporary insurance in effect at the time of 
Stevenson's death was $300,000, the amount printed on the 
conditional receipt, and not $500,000, the amount requested in 
the application. 
5. First Colony argues that the trial court failed to take into 
consideration factual evidence which indicated that the amount of 
insurance created by the issuance of the conditional receipt was 
limited to $250,000. The evidence upon which First Colony relies 
is contained in two affidavits. The affidavit of Leonard 
Reynolds, Executive Vice President of United Underwriters states 
that it is the standard practice of the insurance industry not to 
issue a conditional receipt for an amount exceeding $250,000. An 
exhibit attached to the affidavit of Loretta Stacey, an employee 
of First Colony, indicates that United Underwriters advised 
Talbert Corporation that coverage could not exceed $250,000, and 
that Stevenson agreed to drop the amount of conditional coverage 
to $250,000. This exhibit, a memo to the file of Stevenson, was 
prepared on May 5, 1987, seven months after Stevenson died, and 
eleven months after the insurance policy application had been 
completed. Nowhere else in the record is there any evidence 
supporting these contentions. No evidence has been produced 
which indicates who spoke with Stevenson regarding any aspect of 
the conditional receipt, let alone the limitation on the amount 
of coverage. 
When the trial court determined that the written documents 
were clear and unambiguous regarding the amount of coverage then 
in force, it did not need to consider evidence which was 
extrinsic to the writings. First Colony argues that the $300,000 
limitation of the conditional receipt is clear and unambiguous 
and we agree. Because we agree with First Colony's contention on 
this point, we are not persuaded by their argument that this 
written limitation of $300,000 was orally modified by a phone 
call that allegedly took place between an unknown representative 
of United Underwriters or Talbert Corporation and Stevenson. 
Q 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of 
Maurine Stevenson, and the judgment for $3 00,000. 
Noritfan H. Jacksoq^ Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
*tfudith M. B i l l i n g s ^ Judge*^ 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
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t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y o t h e r than j u s t c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h 
F l e i s s • 
MR. CHRISTIAN: S u r e , I a p p r e c i a t e t h a t . 
Q (BY MR. CHRISTIAN) I t h i n k what I want t o know i s 
c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h Lamar or w i t h Lamar and Roger or w i th you 
and Roge r , any of t h o s e , and you can t e l l me — i f y o u ! l l j u s t 
t e l l me what c o n v e r s a t i o n i t i s , I f d a p p r e c i a t e t h a t . 
A A l l r i g h t . A f t e r t h e p o i n t of i s s u i n g t h e check 
w e ' r e s p e a k i n g of? 
Q Uh-huh . 
A That was done on July the 7th. 
Q Of f86? 
A Yes. We were very much involved in getting things 
arranged with the new company, A. J. Perea, so we were really 
involved heavily in a lot of things going on in our life at 
that time. Towards the end of August, Lamar said to me, 
Maureen, we have not received that policy yet, and I said no, 
thatfs true, so then I initiated a call to Roger's office. 
Q Okay. 
A I spoke to a gentleman, I don't recall his name, 
that was --
Q In Salt Lake? 
A Y e s . He s a i d Roger was in D e n v e r , and I s t a t e d to 
him t h a t we had been in t h e p r o c e s s of g e t t i n g an i n s u r a n c e 
p o l i c y t h r o u g h Roger , t h a t I ' d i s s u e d a check in J u l y and we 
"RyhiHi-f- A 
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i I had not yet received the policy and we were concerned. 
Q When you called Roger's office on the occasion 
you're telling me about, you identified yourself, I presume? 
A Oh, yes* 
5 | Q Did this man seem to know who you were? 
6 | A Yes. 
i 
1
 Q When you talked about the policy, did this man seem 
i 
8 ! to know about the policy? 
i 
9 I A He s a i d he d i d n ' t know what t h e s t a t u s was , t h a t he 
10 J would check i t o u t and g e t back t o me. 
11 Q Did he? 
12 A Yes* 
13 Q How much longer? 
14 A I think the next day or two he returned the call, 
15 told me that First Colony had declined coverage on Lamar. I 
16 asked why, because he had cleared everything in the physical 
17 aspect. He said because we were in a Chapter 11, the company 
18 was in a Chapter 11. 
19 Q Was it? 
20 A Yes. And I said, "What does that have to do with 
21 life coverage on Lamar?" And the fellow said, "You have to 
22 understand the mentality of an insurance company," and I said 
23 okay. "What do you mean?" He said, "They do not want to 
24 issue a policy when someone is in that sort of financial 
25 position," and I said, "Why?" He said, "Because of a 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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possibility of suicide," and I said, "Well, so. With suicide 
the policy isn't in effect anyway." I had no comprehension of 
what he was trying to tell me, and he said, "Well, there have 
been such occasions when suicides have been done and looked 
for real as an accident," and so they were just -- First 
Colony had backed off because of those reasons. 
Q Now, when this man, whatever his name was, was 
giving you the information you have just described, did you 
understand that he was telling you something that was coming 
from the company or something he was making up and telling 
you? How did you take that? 
A I hadn't thought of that. 
Q Or did you take it in any sense? 
A No, I really didn't, just as the facts of what was 
taking place. 
Q Who did you talk to next? 
A Roger then called. He returned — 
Q How long after? 
A Just shortly. The next day or so forth. 
Q Okay. 
A He again reiterated basically what was said by the 
fellow in his office and that he didn't see any problem 
because he could get Lamar right into another company who he 
didn't see would give this same reasoning or any problem about 
securing the policy. 
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Q Did Roger g ive you any more exp lana t ion or t a lked 
about the Chapter 11 or s u i c i d e t h a t t h i s o ther fellow was 
t a lk ing about? 
A I d o n ' t r e c a l l if we go t r e a l l y in to t h a t . I 
suppose we d i d . I d o n ' t remember anyth ing s p e c i f i c a l l y . 
Q What s t i c k s in your mind was t h a t Roger confirmed 
yes , F i r s t Colony won't i s sue the p o l i c y and w e ' l l j u s t t r y to 
get you somewhere e l s e ? 
A Yes. 
Q I s that what i t was? 
A Yes. 
Q Any more discussion than that? 
A He just said that it had been so recent since Lamar 
had had a physical and all of the other things was in place 
that all that would be required would be an updated urine 
specimen and that he would have a kit sent to us to accomplish 
that. 
Q About when did this conversation take place, Mrs. 
Stevenson? 
A This was at the end of August. 
Q Who did you talk to next? 
A Roger himself. 
Q How much longer? 
A Within a week or two weeks. 
Q Was that a call you initiated? 
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is written that says we are not going to insure this man. 
A That would go through our Denver office. 
Q Have you ever seen anything? 
MR. CHRISTIAN: His question is have you ever 
seen such a document. 
A No. 
MR. CHRISTIAN: We understand we have the 
complete Denver file, but I can't swear to that either. 
Q (by Mr. Young) I show you what has been marked 
as Deposition Exhibit Number 19. You received a copy of 
that letter after Mr. Stevenson's death? 
A Yes, I would have. 
Q And it says that she typed the sequence of 
events, and I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 23 
and ask you if that would have been the attachment to that 
letter? 
It would have been. 
So you have had that in your file since November? 
That would be correct. 
Did you, meaning Roger Fleiss, ever contact LaMar 
Stevenson or Maurine Stevenson and say that First Colony had 
rejected the application for insurance in any way? 
A No. 
Q Do you know if anyone did? 
A No. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
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;URETY BONDS AND INSURANCE 
DENVER, COLORADO . 
3RAND JUNCTION, COLORADO. 
:ASPEF(, WYOMING •:• -
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
Novenber 21/1986 
Mr*. Roger Fleiss 
The Talhert Corporation of Utah 
205 West 700 South 
Salt Lake , '.Utah 84101 
Dear Roger: 
Enclosed in this envelope are oopies of First Oolony and Bankers 
Life applications, .underwriting requirements submitted to the 
companies, and notes from our files for the insured Lamar Stevenson. 
After reviewing the file, I typed a sequence of events and have 
enclosed a copy of this for your records. Should you have any 
questions or need further information please give us a call. 
Thank you. 
Yours very truly, 
Christine Fresquez 
Account Assistant/Norman R. Close 
Enclosure 
7> S. £w*6'.jffa Pip0*'" ° ( v f-y1'"-, 
LAMAR STEVENSON 
ORDER OF EVENTS 
1-13-86 Advised Poger lapse of Chubb Life America 
policy, 
1-30-86 Client has sent premium in to Chubb 1-17-86, 
Contacted Chubb, they have pramium but need 
reinstatement form. 
2-5-86 Sent client reinstatenant forms to be mailed 
directly to corrpany. 
3-20-86 Sent client copy of reinstatement to have 
unanswered questions corrpleted. 
4-8-86 Received form from client 
4-25-86 Advised conpany of info, but company requires 
date client was in the hospital. Contacted 
Roger. Roger called back with date. Ocnpany 
closed. 
4-28-86 Contact Chubb with date of hospital date. 
5-1-86 Reinstatement in process per Chubb. 
5-9-86 Pecieved notice of cancel of reinstatement frcm 
Chubb due to time delay of info, and form too 
old to use. Can reopen reinstatement with 
three k premiums and new form. Advised Poger. 
5*-19*-86 Cbntact Chubb to get exact amount due or min prem. 
Darlene A. to call back with info. Need $1,147.46 
5-28-86 Sent client other conpany illustrations 
cc; to Roger 
6-10^36 Sent Roger First Colony applicatio, Lamar 
had advised Poger this is the prcduct they want 
to go with, for a face amount of $500,000. 
7-1-86 Had client examed 
LAMAR STEVENSON 
ORDER OF EVENTS CONTINUED 
7-14-86 Sent application and aviation questionnaire to 
client, 
7-21-86 Fecieved and forward application and aviation 
questionnaire to ccnpany, First ColGny, with h prein. 
7-30-86 First Colony requested alcohol questionnaire 
as underwriting requirerent, 
8-4-86 Cindy/United Underwriters to contact First Colony 
as to "why" the alcohol questionnaire. 
Due to iiispection report. 
8-7-86 Sent insured alcohol questionnaire. 
8-12-36 Cindy/Uiited Underwriters has advised us First 
Colony cannot place coverage to financial information 
obtained from inspection report. However, First 
Colony will submit to reinsurer as First Colcnv 
One, (Universal Life product) 
8-13-86 Fecevied alcohol questionnaire from client. 
8-23-86 Sent Eocer First Colony Life One illustration and Ban 
Life 1 YKT illustration. 
9-27T36 Per torn send Lairar The Eankers life application and 
aviation questionnaire. Bankers to use First 
Colony exam. Sent application and questionnaire to 
client. 
9r-29^ 86 Per United Underwriters First (Dlony closed file 
9-26-86, refund of prerdum submitted with applicatic: 
within the next ten days. 
10-1-86 Submitted Bankers Life application and requirements 
to ccnpany. 
TabE 
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1 covered? 
2 A Initiating the check was in my mind a coverage. 
3 Q When you paid the check, you thought that you were 
4 covered? 
5 A Yes, 
6 Q But my question is you said you were disappointed 
7 in Roger, and I want to understand why you were disappointed 
8 in Roger, and you said because he had from January until 
9 October to get you insurance. Mow I want to ask you what was 
10 in your mind. 
11 Was i t your u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t Roger would be the 
12 one. t h a t would d e c i d e whether a company would g i v e you 
13 c o v e r a g e r a t h e r than t h e company? Did you d e c i d e Roger would 
14 say t o a company y o u ' l l i n s u r e t h e s e p e o p l e ? 
15 A No. 
16 Q What d id you d e c i d e i t v/as Roger should do? 
17 A That w i t h i n h i s rea lm he would be a b l e to s e c u r e a 
18 company, and we had t o t a l c o n f i d e n c e in h i s a b i l i t y in t h a t 
19 a r e a . 
20 Q Tha t he would be a b l e to g e t a company t o cover 
21 you? 
22 A Yes. Of course, we had no idea that there would be 
23 any problem whatsoever at the early point. 
24 Q And if Roger was unable to get coverage because 
25 some company wouldn't take you, what was it in your mind that 
Exhibit C 
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1 Roger should do? 
2 A Well, basically at that point that we found out 
3 First Colony wouldn't cover, then it was his words and total 
4 come across to me that there was no problem, we would just go 
5 with another company. 
6 Q Do you know what efforts Roger was making in 
7 attempting to get a policy with any other companies other than 
8 First Colony? 
9 A Well, just what he had related in the conversation. 
10 Q What efforts he was making with other companies? 
11 A Y e s . 
12 Q What e f f o r t s d i d he r e l a t e t h a t he was making w i t h 
13 o t h e r c o m p a n i e s ? 
14 A I d o n ' t know what e f f o r t s he made . A l l I know i s 
15 t h a t he s a i d he cou ld go t h r o u g h the second company t h a t we 've 
16 m e n t i o n e d , Banke r s w h a t e v e r , and he fo resaw no p rob lem wi th 
17 t h a t . 
18 Q I d i d n ' t ask you what e f f o r t s he was mak ing . I was 
19 a s k i n g you do you know what he t o l d you what e f f o r t s he was 
20 making? 
21 A J u s t t h a t c o n v e r s a t i o n i s t h e o n l y t h i n g I know. 
22 Q Nov;, a s i d e from what he s a i d , you d o n ' t know what 
23 e f f o r t s he was making w i t h any o t h e r compan ie s? 
24 A No, I do n o t . 
25 MR. CHRISTIAN: I t h ink t h a t ' s a l l I h a v e . 
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SURETY 8CNCS ANO 'NSURANCE 
CEV/E.q. CCLCRAOO 
GRANQ JUNCTION. COlCRAOO 
CASPER. WYOMING 
SAL: LAKE z:rr. UTAH 
August 23, 1936 
Mr, Roger Fleiss 
The Talbert Corporation 
205 West 700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101 
Dear Roger: 
Norm requested I send you the enclosed l i f e insurance i l lus t r a t ions 
for the proposed insured Lamar Stevenson. 
The f i r s t three are from Fi rs t Colony Life One, universal l i f e 
product tha t F i r s t Colony wi l l offer to Mr. Stevenson in place 
of the term product they have declined. The i l l u s t r a t i o n shew 
three d i f ferent premium amounts for $500,000 of death benefit 
coverage. 
The fourth i l l u s t r a t i o n i s from Bankers Life. This i s a one year 
term product, with an increasing premium amount for the $500,000 
of death benefi t coverage. 
Please review and contact our office with any questions or if 
v^ e can a s s i s t with the underwriting or placement of th is case. 
Yours very t ru ly , 
Ciri s i t a e Fresque 
Account Assis tant 
Enclosure 
P.S. I hope you had a nice vacation, Welcome Back! 
•"""23SEP0 2SJ6 
P.O. 90X 9244. CENVER, CCLCRAOO 80209, A^EA CCCE 3Ca'8C9-l77^ 
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TabG 
32 
documents that will help you, but I'm just trying to get a 
sequence of it now. 
A Right. I think that was secured about three years 
or so before his death, so that would be f83. 
Q 1983? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Around the time we're talking about now? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And that was a life policy on Lamar, the Chubb 
policy we're talking about? 
A Term life, yes. 
Q Term life. What was the face amount of that; do 
you recall? 
A A million. 
Q A million dollars? 
A Yes. 
Q Was the p o l i c y a c t u a l l y issued? 
A Yes. 
Q How long was that in force? 
A A couple of three years, I believe. 
Q Do you remember what the premiums were? 
A No, I don't. I know they started out at a lesser 
amount than what it was at the time of being discontinued. 
Q So the premiums gradually increased on that policy? 
A That's correct. 
COMPI Exhibit E NSCRIPT 
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Q Do you know what a net level premium policy is? 
A No, I don ! t. 
Q But the premiums inc reased , as far as you can 
unders t and , but the face amount of the p o l i c y s tayed "the same? 
A T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
Q And t h a t po l i cy was e v e n t u a l l y e i t h e r — coverage 
was d i s c o n t i n u e d ? 
A Yes . 
Q Why did the coverage discontinue on that policy? 
A The premium could not be met. 
Q When the coverage was discontinued, what were the 
premiums running? 
A Over a thousand dollars. I don't remember, 
Q A thousand dollars a month or a year or what? 
A I think it was quarterly or annually, but I'm not 
sure on that either. 
Q How old was your husband then? 
A Forty-six. Forty-five actually. Forty-five. 
Q And you were having difficulty making the premium 
payments? 
A That's correct. 
Q Could you have financed it could you have continued 
to make the payments, or was it to the point that you were 
just unable to do it based upon your --
A It had become very difficult to do this, yeah. 
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,:u '/EAR N\LV PAYMENT 
c'O YEAR \^T SURIxENDER 
< 1liE-,E ARE ANNUAL I TED PRHN I UN:- NET Or PARTIAL SNRRFNOERS . 
1 0 . 03 
4 . 77 
10 . 03 
5. 50 
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W nALE 
STEVENSON 
L I F E O N E - S E L E C T 
FIRST COLONY LIFE 
LYNCHBUR6. VIRGINIA 
08/12/1996 
AGENT-
S/A-
TALGEM CURP 
UU 
CLASSIFICATIOH-STANOARO PREF MOHSnOKLR 
M.-.neo paEn«unS 
FIRST YEAR 
IhEnEAFUR 
flEO AftOUNT-
4,5e9.19(AHHUAL) 
SEE PAGE 2 
500.000 
& 
I SPECIFIED AMOUNT INCLUDES ACCOUNT VALUE 
:ufcAEM! INTEREST RATE CREDITED TO THE ACCOUNT VALUE IS 9.50 PERCENT. 6UARANTEEO RATE IS 4.00 PERCENT. 
M INTEREST ANO COST OF INSURANCE RATES ARE SUBJECT TO CHANOE. EXCESS INTEREST IS NOT CREDITEO 
»L A::0'JM1 OF PGLiCY LOAN. THE POLICY LOAN INTEREST RATE IS 5.66 PERCENT PAYABLE IN ADVANCE. 
J..IOES PRESENTED IN THIS PROPOSAL ARE ILLUSTRATIVE ONLY AND ARE NOT GUARANTEED, 
it. FOLLOWING ASSunPTlONS-
THEY ARE BASED 
I) Pf«OGRA*NEO PREMIUMS ARE MADE AND RECEIVEO ON THE PREHIUrt DUE DATE 
21 f.0 POLICY LOANS OR PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS ARE MADE 
i) NO CHANGES IN SPECIFIED AMOUNT OR OPTION OTHER THAN ILLUSTRA1ED 
M CURRENT NON-6UARANTEED COST OF INSURANCE ANO INTEREST RATES REMAIN UNCHANGED. 
S U M M A R Y O F E N D O F Y E A R V A L U E S 
s G U A R A N T E E D 4 00 PERCENT INTEREST' A S S U H E 0 8.00 PERCENT INTEREST C U R R E N T 9.50 PERCENT INTEREST 
TOTAL SURRENDER 
f.R PREMIUMS! VALUE 
5 228*5 7,721 
10 45691 9,316 
IS 6*5*7 
20 91383 
05 cee<5 
RCENT INTEREST AOJUSTEO 
10 fEAR NET PAYMENT 
10 YEAR MET SURRENOER 
20 <l«R NET PAYMENT 
:n yrr.q NfT SURRENOER 
DEATH 
BENEFIT 
500,000 
500,000 
INDICES 
9.14 
7.73 
* ACCOUNT 
VALUE 
20,435 
44,807 
71,291 
94,928 
86,039 
SURRENDER 
VALUE 
18,880 
44,807 
71,291 
94,929 
86,039 
OEATH 
BENEFIT 
500.000 
500,000 
500.000 
500,000 
500,000 
9.14 
2.35 
9 14 
3.67 
ACCOUNT 
VALUE 
21,437 
49.386 
84.106 
124,392 
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SURRENOER 
VALUE 
I9.8e2 
49,386 
84,106 
124,392 
107,479 
OEATH 
BENEFIT 
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500.000 
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500.000 
500.003 
9 14 
1.66 
9 14 
1.97 
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Tab I 
1. Print iull narr.e ol r/oposed Insured 
• S ing lg^g^^r ied Q Widowed Q Divorced Q Separated I /Y? 
City 
ex i Gir.hdara 
Mo.! Day; Yr. ~"l 
oOC. S*rC 
BJrth e n - , iw. 
ff.U* l39lV7i <7A Ifkl^JvUi?£ 
2. Home address 
3. Premium notices t o Q Proposecr Insured at home 
County State Zip Years lived there 
L>^cA «fo^L WUn 7 
D Proposed Insured at business f ] Owner at address in 1< 
4. O Disability Income plan desired. Complete questions 1-8. 18-40 and D.I. Supplemental Application 
- - - —j 5. Disability Income in force (group, state, union, salary 
continuation or individual)? • Yes Q No 
6. Will policy applied for replace or change any othe 
Disability Income insurance? Q Yes • No 
Company or 
Source 
Type of 
^Coverage 
J AmtJ Benefit Elim. ! Give details 
7. D.I. Dividends to Q Reduce prem. • Be pakf in cas 
I 8. D.I. mode Q Annual Q Semi-annual Q PAC 
9. LIFE plan desired Tfez / )/f + 
(For AL show premium OR plan desired) 
Amount ? *3 <T7). OOP » 
 
12. 
" l3." 
Term rider 
FIR $ 
for S. 
Life mode 
Q Annual Q Quarterly Q PAC 
J3J>emi-annual__ ^ _ Q Monthly 
Lifejnsurance in f c r c c ? _ n Yes __Q No 
! Life : ADB -Yr. of Persone 
_Company [amount amount VVDB issue or busing 
Mo. Inc. for 
• WDB Q ADB: base amt. $ 
yrs. 
term rider $_ 
• PAPA Total ann. prem. (Divs. must be add'ns.) 
• Change of Insured Q GPO/GIO $ 
• •Spcuse Term year benefit for $ 
••Fami ly OR Q Children Term for units 
• •Payor Death or Disability • • P a y o r Death 
•Complete Spouse, Child, Payor Application 
T" 1 "f 1 
1 .. 1 1 1 
10. • APL 
11. Dividends to • Reduce prem. Q Purchase add! ins. 
• Accumulate at interest • Be paid in cash 
• EPO - Return CV* • EPO - return of prem.* 
.•Balance as checked 
• Improved policy - AL only 
14. Will policy applied for replace or chang^any other life c 
annuity insurance? • Yes D -No 
Give details _ 
^Proposed Insured is under age 15 complete: 
it (Parent, Guardian, etc.) _ _ 
AppiicantVAdcfress 
Applicant's relationship to 
AmL life ins. on parent or guardTeT 
Amount of life ins. on other children $_ 
Is child in school? Q Yes • No Grade lever 
Answer 16 and 17 on PROPOSED INSURED if age 15 0£ older, otherwise on the Applicant (Parent, Guardian, etc 
! 16. a. Pmn\nV*rAfh/tof 7) / O ? / ^ Years there 
b. Type of business 
17. 
Address QfoO (Uc,4t, it.no h)rS+ 
Occupation 
Duties 
jVh. fds A Ot\ tf+oA ZJO&3 
Annual Earned Income 
Any part time jobs? Duties 
18. Owner 19. 
Owner's Address 
Relationship to Proposed Insured 
Taxpayer ID Number _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Contingent Owner . _ I 
Unless staled above, owner, while living is (a) Proposed 
Insured if 2Q? 15 or older or (b) Applicant if Proposed 
Insured is under age 15. This is • Permanent or 
• Temporary to Q age 18 Q a g e 21 or Q ace 25. 
AA 300 
a. 
b. 
c. 
A-
Beneficiary and relationship to Proposed Insured 
-Tr<K\ I / l o r . <J*M4 OO M < / V S ~ ••/ 
Contingent Beneficiary: 
• Proceeds to be left at interest. Beneficiary to ha 
election and withdrawal rights. 
__ Pay interest „,r_-^.__ssJf[ggyenc 
P2 
Exhibit G 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
V?. * 
. < £ ^ S l l f £ C : w i r * H Y CCS U O I H f 3 . IOWA 5 0 3 3 7 INSURANCE APPLICATION 
^ u u _L £ O 
29.' Do you plan to live or travel (other than vacation) outside of the U.S.? 
•0. Have you ever had life or health insurance rated, declined, modified or cancelled? 
3'^) Have you ever recuested or received benefits because of injury or sickness? 
Yes No 
_u_ET 
32. Do ycu have an application for life or disability income insurance pending in any company, or have you within the 
iast three months applied for such insurance? "V-
j ^ ^ K a v e ycu. or do you plan to engage in hang kite gliding, scuba or sky Giving, stock, modified, sports car, drag 
strip, motorcycle, motor boat, snowmooiie or other type of racing? R" 
\^J Do you plan to fly cr have you, within the last five years flown as a pilot, student pilot or crew memoer? * Z>^ H 
•5. Are you or do you intend to become a member of a military sen/ice? ; H HP' 
;5 . ; Driver's license number /C ( s 1 & 3^ In the last 2 years have you been cnarged with: | 
(a) 2 or more motor vehicle moving violations or accidents? 
(b) driving while intoxicated? 
(c) suspension or revocation of your license? H 
ynave ycu in the last five years been arrested for other than traffic violations? 
• 3 ^ Are you in a regular exerase program (jogging, swimming, etc.)? 
;Any family history of heart or kidney disease, high blood pressure or cancer? 
Within the last 5 years have you: 
(a) been treated or counselled or joined an organization for alcohol or drug use? n> 
(b) used amphetamines, barbiturates, seaatives, LSD, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, or morphine, except as 
prescribed by a doctor? 
"Yes" answers to 23, 34 and 35 require Scons, Aviation, Military Statement respectively. Explain or give reasons 
if "Yes" for questions 29 - 32 and 36 - 40. 
/ A > - > - | 
, -6rv^ JjtUiX-JZ^ fi^ 
* ' ~ V 1^2 (W> 5jy^< 'yzu^.. 
represent that all statements in this application are true and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand tney 
.--? tr.e oasis c: any insurance issued. I agree that, except as the Conditional Receipt provides, the Company shall incur no liability 
n:ess ana un:;l: (1) a poiicy is issued (2)ithe policy is received and accepted by the applicant and (3) the first premium is paid. I 
z-ee that these three conditions must occur v/hile, as far as the applicant knows, there has been no change since the pate cf this 
:"rm in the health or any other factor affecting the insurability of any person proposed for insurance. I agree that only the Heme 
)";ce is authorized to pass on Insurability or to make, change or discharge any contract or waive any of the Company's rents. I 
cree that the right to change the beneficiary is reserved to the owner unless otherwise provided in question 19. Any change in 
•sue age, amount, ciass, plan or benefits maae by the Company shown under "Amendments" is subject to my written ratification. 
understand the laws of the state listed below shall apply to any policy issued. 
^ This application is COD OR • I have paid S for • Life • Disability Income insurance monev ca;c 
•,ave been civen the Conditional Receipt in return. I have read it, and unde 
Signature cf Applicant or Owner (if other than 
Proposed Insured) If Owner is Corporation, 
Officer ether than Proposed Insured should sicn. 
and aaree to its terms. 
Signature of Proposed Insurec 
(only if over age S) 
Tab J 
98 
would have c o s t ? 
2 i A I d o n ' t r e c a l l any d i s c u s s i o n s made one way or the 
3 J o t h e r a t t h a t p o i n t , or a t any p o i n t . I d o n ' t r e c a l l t he 
4 J d i f f e r e n c e s in t h i s a t a l l . 
5 J Q But you had dec ided you could a f ford app rox ima te ly 
6 j $410 in premiums twice a y e a r ? 
7 | A Yes, 
3 | Q For First Colony? 
9 j A Yes. 
10 | Q Could you afford more than that? 
11 A At that time, probably not. 
12 j Q So did Roger Fleiss understand that he would have 
13 to get you another policy that would be within that premium 
14 budget? 
15 A I don't know how that all came about. I think this 
16 was all discussed between Roger and Lamar, and I'm not aware 
17 of that. 
18 Q Do you know what happened to the Bankers Life 
19 a p p l i c a t i o n ? 
20 A It was sent. 
21 Q Sent from who to who? 
22 A The urine sample was enclosed, and whatever forms I 
23 suppose needed to be filled out was sent to whoever, Roger or 
24 to whoever it was asked to be sent to within the kit itself. 
25 I don't recall. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
Exhibit H 
TabK 
' .,ir£7!QN — PARTI 
- ^ P R I N T Oft TYPE 
(a!omL 
P.O. Box 1250 
Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 
// lite Insurance (jimpairti* 
P.O. Bex 2519. Terminal Annex 
Los Angeles, California 90051 NO.L 0 3 4 2 2 7 7 
''TuLL NAME OF PROPOSED INSURED ^ M F L 5 
!
' (Women, give maiden name.) 
fflTsiDENCE ADDRESS: Give No., Street. City, Slate, and Zip Code 
•: 9&0 /Vor^A JbCO LOBS+ 
7" /*** 
Previous addresses, within past 5 years: 
file pU-fori, 
How long at this address?. 
< ? ^ G 3 
ciyr>/x2^n 7-Oescribe Duties: ' 
Name of Employer: 
Business Address: cf(jC ^ ^ t^co cve^-r 
rn>)Plc.-7o,i UTAH £Vb6 3 
6. SOC. SECURITY NO. 
10. 8ENEF CIARY: Give lull name. d a ! e ^ b i r ^ n 7 r e l a t i o n s h i p l o l r 7 
posed insured. Right to change Beneficiary is reserved to Own 
unless o!herw,se indicated. (Businesses should include address ) 
ru^. /^ 
Contingent: _ _ i 
0laUc( 9 
Or-
(jr.dlr Trad- Qar^?m^ 
3S-U r 
11 
• INSSTURAELD:INSURANCE "* F ° R C £ ° " ™ E L , F £ 0 F T H E P R 0 P 0 S E D 
Company Amount 
V>U?>v^u 
4. DATE OF BIRTH 
Month Day Year 
5. PLACE OF BIRTH 
I PLAN AND AMOUNT (For Life One,™ indicate whether Option 1 or 2 
is applicable.): 
v\-£U<L4 - J L & . , 
^ /, coo, doo- tecqeca 
Ace. Death frssue Year 
12. REPLACEMENT: Is thisjnsurance intended to replace or change am 
n <&!§ting insurance^kr^fuding annuities, in any company or society' 
( v r X Y e s N o p ^ II "Yes." explain. 
RIOERS: O WP 
Q Other: 
Q AOB 5 . 
iannuai 
8. RATED CLASS: Issue Rated Class (increased premiums) if ap-
plicable? D Yes No £3 
9. OWNER (If other than Proposed Insured, give full name, address 
relationship to Proposed Insured, and S.S.or Employer I.D. No.): 
Owner \s D Individual D Sole Proprietorship 
D Corporation D Partnership 
D Trustee (Give name of trust and date of trust agreement.) 
13. MODE OF PREMIUM PAYMENT: D Annual ^ S e m 
D Quarterly D Pre-Authorized Check D Other: 
14. AMOUNT REMITTED WITH THIS APPLICATION (in exchange lor the 
Conditional Receipt bearing the same number as this application): 
S V/Q. °° 
15. SEND PREMIUM NOTICES TO: R e s i d e n c e Q Business.' 
Q Owner (II other than Proposed Insured). If more than one Owner. l\ 
give name and address of the one Owner who should receive thr 
original notice: 0 
O Other: 
D E P O S I T I O N 
EXHIBIT 
15 
16. AUTOMATIC PREMIUM L O A N . - ^ Y e s 
if applicable unless checked here.) 
17. SPECIAL REQUESTS: 
J_ f :• 
- t No C (Will be effective": [ 
'.3 
! epresent that the statements and answers given in this application are true, complete, and correctly recorded to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
iree that: (1) the entire contract will consist of this application and the policy issued in response to it; (2) no agent of the Company can: (a) make or modi! ' ^ 
ntracts: (b) waive any rights or requirements of the Company: or (c) waive any information requested by the Company; and (3) except as provided in th {k 
mditional Receipt, if issued, with the same number as this application, no insurance will take effect unless: (a) the policy is delivered to the Owner; (b) th ^S 
s: medal premium is paid; and (c) there has been no change since the date of this application in the insurability of all persons proposed for insurance M 
cknowiedge receipt oUhe Notice to Proposed Insured 
1 9 ^ 
M 
^ • ' - ^ r (ii c iner ;r^n 
iliCN* - PART II MON.V.EDJCAL P 0. Eei 1280 P.O. g0x 2 5 t g T „ ~ ,na, A n . o j 
Lynchburg. Virginia 24505 Los Angeles, Cahlorma 90051* j #ASE Pfi:'iT 
- ,j,js section is to be completed il no medical summation is required. The PROPOSED INSURED should 
j.clion-
- H Name of Proposed Insured. 
comment on all "Yes" answers in if.e "C«U 
•daJlLsLr ^A^^SJ^JJZA^: 
_ Date of Birth 2 1/3 !J>? s
 s No SQJLW? 
; , j . Nameandaddres$ofyourpersonalphy$ician(lfnone.sostate)__JS_N><- ST^ . k \ 
b. Date and reason for last consultation. 
c. What treatment was given or medication prescribed? 
2. Have you ever been treated for or ever had any known indication of: 
a. Disorder of eyes. ears, nose, or throat? 
b. Dizziness, fainting, convulsions, head injury, headaches, speech defect, 
paralysis or stroke, tremor, muscle weakness, depression' other mental or 
nervous disorder? 
c. Shortness of breath, persistent hoarseness or cough, blood spitting, bron-
chus, pleurisy, asthma, emphysema, tuberculosis, or chronic respiratory 
disorder? 
d. Chest pain, palpitation, high blood pressure, rheumatic fever or other severe 
infection, heart murmur, heart attack, varicose veins, phlebitis, or other 
disorder of the heart or blood vessels? 
e. Jaundice, intestinal bleeding, ulcer, hernia, appendicitis, colitis, diver-
ticulitis, hemorrhoids, recurrent indigestion, or other disorder*of the 
stomach, intestines, liver, gallbladder, pancreas, or spleen? 
Sugar, albumin, blood or pus in urine, venereal disease, stone or other 
disorder of kidney, bladder, prostate, or reproductive organs? 
Diabetes, goiter, thyroid, or other endocrine disorders? 
Neuralgia, neuritis, sciatica, rheumatism, arthritis, gout, or disorder of the 
muscles or bones, including the spine, back and joints?' 
Deformity, lameness, or amputation? 
Disorder of skin or lymph glands, cyst, tumor, or cancer? 
Allergies, anemia, bleeding tendency, or other disorder of the blood? 
Yes 
• 
D 
a 
No 
E-j 
H 
!• 
a 
D 
D 
a 
a 
a 
3. Other than above, have you within the past 5 years: 
DETAILS of "Yes" answers. (IDENTIFY QUE^  
NUMBER, CIRCLE APPLICABLE ITEMS: In 
diagnoses, dates, duration, and names anc 
dresses of all attending physicians and m--
facilities.) 
2T 
53- M 
G-T 
_ " 
Had any mental or physical disorder not listed above? Q r_"j 
Had a checkup, consultation. Alness, injury, surgery? _ f Q 
Been a patient in a hospital, clinic, sanatorium, or other medical facility" E- a 
Had EKG, X-ray. other diagnostic test? r_" Q 
Been advised to have any diagnostic test, hospitalization, or surgery which 
was not completed? 
4. Are you now under observation or taking treatment or medication? a &ri 
5. Have you had any change in weight in the past year? 
a. it "Yes." how much? Gain lbs.. Loss lbs. 
b. Give present heigh!__Jt.___in.. weight__ilbs. 
Have you ever: 
a Smoked cigarer.es? H "Yes." how many daily' 
Has use been discontinued? If "Yes." explain 
a 
Used alcoholic beverages? If "Yes." how often and how many ounces? 
. Has use Deen discontinued? If "Yes." explain. 
Used narcotics, stimulants, sedatives, hallucinogenics. or any c;her drugs 
A-nat kind and what frequency and not srescnbea by a physician? If "Yes 
a 
a 
a 
a 
G 
a 
a 
:esn _•<: res . 
our C-"..'JS " c:r.r«ec;ic.". ;;i;n ycjr'e.T.;:cy.T.:r.t;: rr.»;i2ry service7 
9. Have you ev-r raouesJcd c; .'2C2;ved a per.sicn. benefits, or payment because o! .^ 
an ir.iury. s.ckness. or disability? D En 
\0. Has any comoany cr society declined to issue, reinstate, cr renew a policy; of-
fered a rated or modified pclicy; or postponed or cancelled any insurance on your 
life? D &r 
11.1s any application or informal inquiry for insurance on your life or heailh pending 
in any other company or society, or have you ever withdrawn such an application • 
or informal inquiry? Q 01 
12. Do you intend to fly other than as a passenger or have you flown other than as a J* 
passenger during the past 2 years? (If "Yes." complete Aviation Questionnaire.) \& D 
13. Have you in Hie past 2 years engaged in, or do you expect to engage in, racing 
(automobile, go-kart, cycle, boat, snowmobile) or diving (skin, scuba, sky)? (II 
"Yes," complete Hazardous Activity Questionnaire.) D ©r 
14. family History: Is there a history of tuberculosis, diabetes, cancer, high blood 
pressure, he^n or kidney disease, mental illness, or suicide? • erf 
Father 
Mother 
Brothers and Sisters No. Living gi 
No. Dead 
Age if 
Living 
£6 
£ l 
Age at 
Death 
£3L 
Cause of Death 
\\fi\[^cjjr^°r Qr*r:A-
ZV»$pt 
_ ? " ^ W 
*
:
.^  
15. Answer if applicable: Yes No 
a. Have you ever had any disorder of menstruation, pregnancy, or of the female 
organs or breasts? D D 
b. To the best of your knowledge and belief are you now pregnant? Q Q 
represent that the statements and answers given above are true, complete, and correctly recorded to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Sio6adLaU^NJ<q . ( .^ cf(X& ^Chj
 f (CZfk J^ this ^ S ^ day of T T T M t - ^ _ 19^2 
ZJ*ZS'„•' Proposed Insured 
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m J THE WITNESS: As being involved in all of this? 
2 j MR. CHRISTIAN; Yes. 
3 | THE WITNESS: Just that I felt very let down by 
4 ! P.oger, because he was our agent. 
5 I Q (BY MR. CHRISTIAN) Why did you feel let down by 
6 | Roger? 
i 
7 ! A That he had had from b a s i c a l l y January through 
i 
3 ! u n t i l t h e d e a t h , which was c l e a r in O c t o b e r , t o s e c u r e a 
9 I p o l i c y , and h i s no t do ing so l e f t me in a world t h a t was no t 
10 ' n i c e . 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q So you would think that from January to October 
! Roger should have gotten a policy of insurance for you? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you think he should have gotten it with First 
Colony? 
A Again, that's not in his realm as to what insurance 
company would take us or not. I understand that, but — 
Q That's my point. Was it your understanding that 
Roger would decide what insurance companies would cover you or 
the insurance companies would decide what insurance companies 
would cover you? What was your understanding? 
A My understanding was that we were covered by First . 
Colony up until the time of the conversation that I spoke of 
earlier. 
Q What had transpired to make you think you were 
co.«—mr.xor.n TRANSCRIPT 
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